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I. INTRODUCTION

“[I]t has become common in some quarters to conflate human
rights and the law of war/international humanitarian law.
Nevertheless, despite the growing convergence of various
protective trends, significant differences remain.”1
The purpose of war is to compel human submission through the
application of violence in the name of state power; the purpose of human
rights law is to prevent this.2 These conflicting paradigms are on a
collision course in modern armed conflict, often waged amid civilian
populations whose support is essential to success in counterinsurgency.3
The lack of clarity in how these norms interact is confusing, prolongs
conflict, and diminishes protections for combatants and civilians alike.
This Article explores the gap between the laws of war and human rights
in light of the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, and proposes an
approach to begin reconciling the two norms.
The laws of war and human rights have fundamentally different
origins and historical application.4 Despite this, human rights law has
trended toward expansive reading of its applicability, including

1
Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. I NT’ L L. 239, 240
(2000) (emphasis added).
2
Eminent law of war scholar and retired Marine Colonel Hays Parks has contrasted the
warfighting and law enforcement paradigms in the context of when force may be used, and
how much force is appropriate. See W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation
in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 I NT’ L L. & POL . 769,
778–80 (2010) (distinguishing the rights of combatants and civilians in peacetime and
during armed conflict). As will be discussed below, current U.S. military doctrine draws
these concepts uncomfortably close together in counterinsurgency warfare. U.S. D EP’ T OF
ARMY, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, C OUNTERINSURGENCY 7-5, ¶¶ 7-26 (2006) [hereinafter FM
3-24],
available
at
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf
(“In
counterinsurgencies, warfighting and policing are dynamically linked. The moral purpose
of combat operations is to secure peace. The moral purpose of policing is to maintain the
peace.”).
3
Retired Air Force Officer Bard O’Neill, a professor of international affairs at the
National War College in Washington, D.C., lectures and writes extensively on
counterinsurgency type and method. See B ARD E. O’N EILL, I NSURGENCY & TERRORISM:
FROM R EVOLUTION TO APOCALYPSE 110 (2d ed. 2005) (viewing popular support from the
perspective of the insurgent, and noting that “[o]f all the factors influencing the
progression of insurgencies, popular support probably receives the most attention in the
literature and oratory of the participants”).
4
See, e.g., Meron, supra note 1; see Y ORAM D INSTEIN , THE C ONDUCT OF H OSTILITIES
UNDER THE L AW OF I NTERNATIONAL ARMED C ONFLICT (2004).
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extending human rights obligations into armed conflict.5 This expansion
is largely accomplished by blurring the distinction between legal
requirements—concerned with mechanical compliance with rules—and
policy objectives—focused on thematic adherence to aspirational ideals.
Pursuing policy objectives, these arguments pass from one system of
laws into another, crossing a field of argument grounded in “soft law.”6
Merging the laws of war and human rights carries legal and tactical
risks in current counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. Those
operations constitute state practice, an element of customary
international law, and what is now doctrine may in the future be
interpreted as law, thereby restricting our warfighting capabilities.
Increased tactical risk is already evident in the Tactical Directives issued
by the International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”), which restricts
conduct permitted under the law of war in an effort to minimize civilian
casualties.7
As both a superpower and prime state proponent of human rights,
the United States has a heightened duty to reconcile the conflict between
the laws of war and human rights. That reconciliation is a logical
extension of our duties to civilians and combatants alike, and must
include two main elements: The use of inherent executive authority to
harmonize the expression of the opinio juris in documents related to
armed conflict,8 and a “minilateral” treaty approach that provides for
both the security interests of specially-affected states and a critical mass
of legitimacy to further future treaty practice.9 While the recent
Executive Order regarding Guantánamo Bay detainees employs
executive authority,10 its welcome issuance is overshadowed by the
contemporaneous announcement that the United States would apply the

Professors Delahunty and Yoo believe that efforts to press human rights into the law
of war began with the United Nations (“UN”) Conference on Human Rights in 1968.
Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, What Is the Role of International Human Rights Law in the
War on Terror?, 59 D EPAUL L. R EV. 803, 817 (2010).
6
The separation of these two branches of law, and the area through which an argument
would pass in transiting from one to the other, is depicted in a diagram attached to this
Article as Appendix A.
7
See generally Tactical Directives of Generals McKiernan, McChrystal, and Petraeus, at
apps. B–D.
8
See R ESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF THE FOREIGN R ELATIONS L AW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) cmt. c (1987) (noting the term comes from the Latin opinio juris sive necessitatis, a
practice undertaken by a state out of a sense of legal obligation).
9
Moisés Naìm, Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get Real International Action,
FOREIGN P OL ’ Y, July/Aug. 2009, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/
2009/06/18/minilateralism.
10
Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7, 2011).
5
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human rights principles,11 which are found in Article 75 of Additional
Protocol I as a matter of “legal obligation,”12 a pronouncement generating
as many questions as answers.
Part II of this Article examines the historical underpinnings and
evolution of these two branches of public international law. In Part III,
the expansion of human rights norms into armed conflict is viewed
through the lens of counterinsurgency, arguing that current operations
in Afghanistan have set a baseline of state practice, which may ripen into
customary law. Part IV takes note of recent presidential actions, which
may cement this transference of human rights norms in armed conflict,
and proposes domestic and international approaches toward reconciling
these two competing branches of the law.
II. THE FRICTION BETWEEN HUMANITY AND HUMANITARIAN
Unlike human rights law, the law of war allows . . . the killing
and wounding of innocent human beings not directly
participating in an armed conflict, such as civilian victims of
lawful collateral damage. It also permits certain deprivations
of personal freedom without convictions in a court of
law. . . . It permits far-reaching limitations of freedoms of
expression and assembly.13
The law that protects in war is the law of war: the lex specialis of
armed conflict.14 However, the aspirational language of human rights
law provides strong temptation to bridge the gap between the laws of
war and peace, and differing opinions are often drawn sharply on how,
or whether, to reconcile the laws of war and human rights.15 This
11
Protections in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I are distilled from the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AT 865 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter
C OMMENTARY].
12
Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantánamo and
Detainee Policy (Mar. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Fact Sheet] (emphasis added), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/fact-sheet-new-actions-guantnamo-and-detainee-policy (“The U.S. Government will therefore choose out of a sense of
legal obligation to treat the principles set forth in Article 75 [of Additional Protocol I] as
applicable to any individual it detains in an international armed conflict . . . .”).
13
Meron, supra note 1, at 240.
14
Nancie Prud’homme, Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a More Complex and Multifaceted
Relationship?, 40 I SR. L. R EV. 356, 367 (2007) (“[L]ex specialis derogat legi generali conveys that
specific law prevails over general law.”).
15
Compare Cordula Droege, Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 90
I NT’ L R EV. R ED C ROSS 501, 548 (2008) (maintaining that “there is no going back to a
complete separation” of human rights law and the law of armed conflict), and Francoise J.
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dissonance is compounded by the commonality of some terms to both
branches of law,16 making it “easy to assume—wrongly—that it is ‘a law
concerning the protection of human rights in armed conflicts’ [sic].”17
What was once referred to simply as the law of war became the law of
armed conflict, and later international humanitarian law (“IHL”), a
“label [that] has the marked disadvantage of masking the role military
necessity plays in the law governing armed conflict.”18
A. Law in War and Peace
Long before these modern humanitarian ideals were formally
expressed in the law of war, scholars and clergymen examined the use
and conduct of war.19 The customs of war became more structured in
the nineteenth century, first in military orders,20 and later by treaty.21
Hampson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law
from the Perspective of a Human Rights Treaty Body, 90 I NT’ L R EV. R ED C ROSS 549 (2008)
(exploring how human rights law applies in armed conflict and concluding, inter alia, that
additional training and resources will be required for international courts and human
rights bodies to process what are likely to be difficult cases in an unresolved area of law),
with Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Operationalizing the Law
of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 H ARV. N AT’ L SEC. L.J. 45, 48 (2010) (arguing for new
definitions of different types of combatants to make the law easier to apply and
highlighting Mr. Guiora’s views, as he is a retired Israeli military officer), and Major
Michelle A. Hansen, Preventing the Emasculation of Warfare: Halting the Expansion of Human
Rights Law into Armed Conflict, 194 MIL. L. R EV. 1, 7 (2007) (arguing that the United States
should take a lead position in objecting to the expansion of human rights law into armed
conflict).
16
Professor Solis notes that the merger of norms in their terms is, in part, related to the
perspective of the writer: “The conflation of LOAC/IHL terminology reflects a desire of
humanitarian-oriented groups and nongovernmental organizations to avoid phrases like
‘law of war’ in favor of more pacific terms, perhaps in the hope that battlefield actions may
someday follow that description.” GARY D. SOLIS, THE L AW OF ARMED C ONFLICT:
I NTERNATIONAL H UMANITARIAN L AW IN WAR 23 (2010). Given the observation, Dr. Solis’
choice of terms for the title of his book is noteworthy in that it incorporates all the
constituent elements of this argument: law, armed conflict, humanitarianism, and war. See
generally id.
17
D INSTEIN, supra note 4, at 20 (“Although the expressions ‘human’ and ‘humanitarian’
strike a similar chord, it is essential to resist . . . them as intertwined or interchangeable.”).
18
See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian
Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 806 (2010) (briefly summarizing
the evolution of international humanitarian law, noting that the grafting of the term
“humanitarian” into the descriptive term for this body of law is largely due to the
International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), and discussing the “trend toward
according greater weight to the humanitarian features of the law”).
19
See, e.g., D AVID K ENNEDY, O F WAR AND L AW 47–48 (2006) (summarizing the work of
Hugo Grotius and other ancient authors as milestones in the evolution of the “‘just war’”
theory).
20
See Parks, supra note 2, at 771 n.6 (recognizing that U.S. Army General Orders No. 100
art. 22, Apr. 24, 1863 is also known as the “Lieber Code”).
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Early agreements in the Hague tradition focused on the means and
methods of war, whereas later treaties in the Geneva tradition shifted
focus from regulating process to protecting people.22
Human rights law is much more recent, emerging with the
formation of the United Nations (“UN”) after World War II.23 The
human rights framework focuses on the “freedoms, immunities, and
benefits which, according to widely accepted contemporary values,
every human being should enjoy in the society in which he or she lives”
in peacetime.24 Thus, protecting people from abuses at the hands of their
own government is the core of human rights law,25 an endeavor less
focused on the might of states than the rights of citizens:
[h]uman rights law is designed to operate primarily in
normal peacetime conditions, and within the framework
of the legal relationship between a state and its citizens.
The [LOAC], by contrast, is chiefly concerned with the
abnormal conditions of armed conflict and the
relationship between a state and the citizens of its
adversary, a relationship otherwise based upon power
rather than law.26

21
See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague IV]; Convention Concerning Bombardment by
Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351, 1 Bevans 681 [hereinafter Hague
IX]; Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case
of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310 [hereinafter Hague V], cited in I NT’ L &
O PERATIONAL L AW D EP ’ T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN .’ S L EGAL C TR. & SCH ., U.S.
ARMY, JA 422, OPERATIONAL L AW H ANDBOOK 9 (2010) [hereinafter O PERATIONAL L AW
H ANDBOOK].
22
See Parks, supra note 2, at 771 (“While Geneva law is concerned with protection of war
victims . . . Hague law deals in large measure with the conduct of hostilities.”).
23
See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 816 (“[I]n an internationalized form [human
rights law] can be said to have originated as recently as the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights . . . .”); see O PERATIONAL L AW H ANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 43.
24
R ESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF THE F OREIGN R ELATIONS L AW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 701 cmt. a (1987); see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 812 n.14 (“‘In fact, Human
Rights represent the most generous principles in humanitarian law, whose laws of war are
only one particular and exceptional case, which appears precisely at times when war
restricts or harms the exercising of human rights.’” (citing J EAN PICTET, THE PRINCIPLES
OF I NTERNATIONAL H UMANITARIAN L AW 32 (1996)).
25
See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 821 n.87 (“‘[IHRL is] a different sphere. It is no
longer a question of protecting man against the evils of war, but against the abuses of the
State and the vicissitudes of life.’” (alteration in original) (citing JEAN PICTET, THE
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 32 (1966))).
26
Id. at 812 (alterations in original) (quoting C HRISTOPHER G REENWOOD , HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL B ASIS, IN THE H ANDBOOK OF H UMANITARIAN L AW IN ARMED
C ONFLICTS 1, 12 (Dieter Fleck, 2d ed. 2008)).
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These divergent “historical . . . roots [have] not prevented the
principle of humanity from becoming the common denominator of both
systems.”27
Slow to emerge, human rights law has not been slow to expand. The
establishment of the UN in 1945 was followed in short order by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,28 followed by other human
rights treaties,29 the most controversial of which in the context of armed
conflict is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”).30 Because the ICCPR addresses the deprivation of life and
liberty—circumstances of unfortunate frequency in war—its application
in war would have a profound effect on the conduct of hostilities.31 The
following section will explore the theories which seek to reconcile the
two systems.
B. Displacement or Reconciliation?
While the laws of war and human rights are nested in different
branches of public international law, the vacuum between the two
archetypes has drawn elements of each into discussion of the other. On
one end of the spectrum, some believe the two paradigms are
“diametrically opposed,”32 because the law of war permits “a degree of
Meron, supra note 1, at 245; see id. (“Current trends point to even greater reliance on
that principle.”).
28
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
29
See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
30
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Preamble, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
law/pdf/ccpr.pdf.
31
The view that the ICCPR applies in armed conflict is gaining favor. See, e.g., Kenneth
Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law 14 (Brookings Inst.,
Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Hoover Inst., Working Paper No. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0511_counterterrorism_anderson.aspx
(discussing “the growing belief that human rights law, and the ICCPR particularly,
continue to apply in some fashion even during hostilities”).
32
Compare Geoffrey Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying
Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. I NT’ L H UMANITARIAN L EGAL STUD . 52, 76
(2010) (observing that the legal standard under the law of war “for depriving someone of
life is diametrically opposed to the authority of state actors to employ deadly force in a
peacetime context”), with G.I.A.D. Draper, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 1979 ACTA
JURIDICA 193, 205 (1979) (“The attempt to confuse the two regimes of law is insupportable
in theory and inadequate in practice. The two regimes are not only distinct but are
diametrically opposed. . . . At the end of the day, the law of human rights seeks to reflect
the cohesion and harmony in human society and must, from the nature of things, be a
different and opposed law to that which seeks to regulate the conduct of hostile
relationships between states or other organized armed groups . . . .”).
27
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overbreadth that is inconsistent with human rights law.”33 That
overbreadth includes practices that human rights would not
systematically bear, such as “a willingness to kill people in the pursuit of
political ends,”34 and also “the infliction of death on enemy personnel
irrespective of the actual risk they present.”35 Such status-based
targeting, agnostic to the issue of threat, is faulted by those on the other
end of the spectrum who suggest that a human rights-based paradigm
should be required, regardless of what the law of war has historically
permitted.36
Attempts to reconcile these two extremes generally fall into one of
two broad categories: lex specialis and complementarity. The United
States has long held the view that the law of war is not only the lex
specialis displacing a less particular human rights rule, but the lex specialis
maximus,37 displacing the entire regime of human rights law on
commencement of armed conflict.38 This interpretive position was
forming even as human rights law began emanating from the UN, at a
time when American sentiment disfavoring human rights treaties was so
strong that it nearly resulted in an amendment to the Constitution.39
This interpretive stance endures, and the United States still does not

33
Corn, supra note 32, at 77; see also id. (explaining that human rights law in peacetime
does not permit the use of force based on status, but rather focuses on conduct and threat
in determining the legitimacy of any use of force).
34
Anderson, supra note 31, at 5.
35
Corn, supra note 32, at 77.
36
See, e.g., Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. L EGAL ANALYSIS 69
(2010).
37
This term, undefined elsewhere, was used by a Department of State official at a recent
academic conference. That official spoke in his personal capacity, and on a non-attribution
basis. The Author is grateful to use the term, and regrets the inability to accord by-name
recognition in this case.
38
See I NT’ L & O PERATIONAL L AW D EP ’ T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN .’ S L EGAL C TR. &
SCH ., U.S. ARMY, L AW OF WAR D ESKBOOK 189–90 (2010) [hereinafter L AW OF WAR
D ESKBOOK]. Another interpretive maxim, expresio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression
of one thing means the exclusion of others), also counsels separation of these fields of law.
See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: Can Foreign
Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions?, 4 C HI. J. I NT’ L L. 283, 292 (2003) (“[T]he canon
makes the most sense when, as with GATT, the express exceptions are numerous, carefully
drafted, and detailed. The case for expresio unius is also stronger when the subject matter of
the proposed implicit exception was within the contemplation of the drafters.”).
39
See Louis Henkin, Commentary, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The
Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. I NT’ L L. 341, 349 (1995) (noting that the amendment was
proposed by Ohio’s Senator Bricker, and its purpose was “to bury the so-called Covenant
on Human Rights so deep that no one holding high public office will ever dare to attempt
its resurrection”). The measure was defeated by a single vote in the Senate. See Joel R.
Paul, The Rule of Law is Not For Everyone, 24 B ERKELEY J. I NT’ L L. 1046, 1060 (2006)
(reviewing PHILIPPE SANDS, L AWLESS WORLD (2005)).
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apply the ICCPR extraterritorially,40 and much less in armed conflict.41
Despite its historical primacy and the support of the United States and
Israel,42 lex specialis has become the minority view.43
Complementarity, a less expansive view of the lex specialis theory,
suggests the laws of war and human rights are not in contradiction, but
rather are “based on the same principles and values, [and] can influence
and reinforce each other mutually.”44 Complementarity offers the
“possibility . . . that IHL prevails where it contains an express provision
which addresses a similar field to that of a human rights norm.”45
Practical difficulties with this theory include the strong aversion under
human rights law to practices that are common and protected in war,
such as targeted killing and the killing of civilians.46 Also unresolved is
the question of whether and to what extent states may employ their
armed forces in coordination with other states with different obligations
under other treaties.47 Nonetheless, some scholars conclude it is
40
The United States reaffirmed this position in its response to certain recommendations
from the UN Human Rights Committee. See, e.g., U.S. Follow-up Report on Implementation of
ICCPR: United States Responses to Selected Recommendations of the Human Rights, U.S. DEP’T
STATE (O CT. 10, 2007), http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/l/2007/112673.htm (“The United
States takes this opportunity to reaffirm its long-standing position that the Covenant does
not apply extraterritorially. States Parties are required to ensure the rights in the Covenant
only to individuals who are (1) within the territory of a State Party and (2) subject to that
State Party’s jurisdiction. The [U.S.] Government’s position on this matter is supported by
the plain text of Article 2 of the Covenant and is confirmed in the Covenant’s negotiating
history (travaux preparatoires).”).
41
See L AW OF WAR D ESKBOOK, supra note 38, at 189–90.
42
Hampson, supra note 15, at 550.
43
Rep. of the Study Group of Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug.
11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/
english/a_cn4_l682.pdf.
44
Droege, supra note 15, at 521.
45
Hampson, supra note 15, at 560.
46
See Anderson, supra note 31, at 14 (analyzing the strategic, moral, and humanitarian
logic that supports targeted killings); see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts, art. 51(5)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol
I], reprinted in I NT’ L & OPERATIONAL L AW D EP ’ T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN .’ S L EGAL
C TR. & SCH ., U.S. ARMY, L AW OF WAR D OCUMENTARY S UPPLEMENT 197–231 (2010),
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law-of-war-documentarysupplement_2010.pdf (noting that while Article 51(1)–51(3) prohibit intentional targeting of
civilians “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities,” the
proportionality test found in Article 51(5)(b) makes express allowance for intentional attacks
resulting in “incidental loss of civilian life” provided that such loss is not excessive “in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”). Human rights law
provides no such advance permission to kill the innocent.
47
This is the case in Afghanistan, where little has been said about the extraterritorial
applicability of the human rights norms in effect for other North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (“NATO”) troop-contributing nations who are parties to the European Court
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“beyond argument that the majority of the international community
views [the laws of war and human rights] as complementary.”48
Teleological difficulties associated with the merger of these two
bodies of law do not, however, imply that human rights have no
influence in war or that use of some human rights-based terms cannot be
successful. An example of effective importation of a widely-known legal
standard from the human rights law framework into the law of war is
found in the Standing Rules of Engagement, which authorize use of force
in self-defense based on “all facts and circumstances known to U.S.
forces at the time.”49 This use of a law enforcement “totality-of-thecircumstances” standard on the battlefield is appropriate and serves the
interests of both paradigms well.50 However, importing even seemingly
innocuous terms from one framework into the other requires caution, as
those terms can inadvertently import broader policy considerations.51
Those policy considerations can be problematic. As a practical
matter, the policies at issue in armed conflict are approached by different
actors in different ways. States have interests and considerations that
international organizations do not. These perspectives are distorted
further as they enter the competitive dialogue, which invariably
accompanies formation of treaties, and pass through the gap depicted in
Appendix A.52

of Human Rights (“ECHR”). See VINCENT M ORELLI & PAUL B ELKIN , C ONG. R ESEARCH
SERV., RL33627, NATO IN AFGHANISTAN: A TEST OF THE TRANSATLANTIC A LLIANCE 11
(2009) (citing Leo Shane III, NATO Commander Asks Member Nations to Drop Troop Limits,
STARS & STRIPES (Oct. 25, 2006), http://www.stripes.com/news/nato-commander-asksmember-nations-to-drop-troop-limits-1.55918).
48
Major J. Jeremy Marsh, Rule 99 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law Study
and the Relationship Between the Law of Armed Conflict and International Human Rights Law,
ARMY L AW., May 2009, at 22.
49
CHAIRMAN OF THE J OINT C HIEFS OF STAFF, I NSTR. 3121.01B, STANDING R ULES OF
E NGAGEMENT/STANDING R ULES FOR THE U SE OF FORCE FOR U.S. FORCES, AT ENCL. A,
¶2e (2005) [hereinafter SROE], reprinted in O PERATIONAL L AW H ANDBOOK, supra note 21,
at 76 (“The determination of whether the use of force against U.S. forces is imminent will
be based on an assessment of all facts and circumstances known to U.S. forces at the time
and may be made at any level. Imminent does not necessarily mean immediate or
instantaneous.”).
50
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983).
51
See Matthew C. Waxman, Guantánamo, Habeas Corpus, and Standards of Proof: Viewing
the Law Through Multiple Lenses, 42 C ASE W. R ES. J. I NT’ L L. 245, 245–63 (2009) (discussing
practical implications of importing standards of proof and other legal terms and evidence
for detention decisions).
52
Some might argue that this “gap” is not a gap at all. As discussed further below,
many believe that the application of human rights law in armed conflict is already clear. It
is equally clear that others hold a different view, and those differing views largely regard
matters of state practice, opinio juris, and advocacy.
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In general, states argue that the gap between the laws of war and
human rights is the stuff of policy, and that states are free to do as they
please to the extent that no express treaty or customary law governs.53
By contrast, non-sovereign actors—such as international organizations—
argue that the gap between the norms is filled with human rights
obligations, sometimes even when the express language at issue seems
contrary.54 Because non-sovereign actors risk nothing in taking such
expansive readings of the law, the weight accorded to their views must
be viewed in the proper context. These non-sovereign actors are the
subject of the next section.
C. Confluence of Norms by Non-Sovereign Actors
Confluence of the law in war and human rights is also found in the
efforts of inter- and non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”). Two
prominent yet controversial research efforts undertaken by the ICRC, the
Customary International Humanitarian Law Study (“CIHL Study”) and the
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities
(“DPH Guidance”) blur distinctions between the two bodies of law.55
The CIHL Study proved flawed from the outset by presuming
complementarity and failing to comment on significant criticism of that
very merger.56 This presumption is highly problematic, given the weight
Capt. Brian J. Bill, Human Rights: Time for Greater Judge Advocate Understanding, ARMY
L AW., June 2010, at 55–59 (discussing the current and historical U.S. position on application
of human rights law in armed conflict, and summarizing the UN response to that position
within the context of the ICCPR).
54
Id. at 58 (noting that the UN Human Rights Committee has adopted the position that
the ICCPR applies to persons within a state’s territory or subject to its jurisdiction—the
disjunctive “and”—despite the terms of Article 2 of the ICCPR, which apply the treaty’s
protections to persons within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction).
55
See JEAN -MARIE H ENCKAERTS & L OUISE D OSWALD -B ECK, C USTOMARY
I NTERNATIONAL H UMANITARIAN L AW (2005); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary
International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of
Law in Armed Conflict, 87 I NT’ L R EV. R ED C ROSS 175, 179 (2005), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0860.pdf (summarizing the study’s
purpose and product); see also I NT’ L C OMM. OF R ED C ROSS, I NTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON
THE N OTION OF D IRECT P ARTICIPATION IN H OSTILITIES UNDER I NTERNATIONAL
H UMANITARIAN L AW (2009) [hereinafter I NTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE], available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0990.pdf.
56
In scoping the CIHL Study, the authors noted:
Where relevant, practice under international human rights law has
been included in the study. This was done because international
human rights law continues to apply during armed conflicts, as
indicated by the express terms of the human rights treaties themselves,
although some provisions may, subject to certain conditions, be
derogated from in time of public emergency.
The continued
applicability of human rights law during armed conflict has been
53
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domestic and international tribunals will likely accord the ICRC’s work
when interpreting international obligations.57 The CIHL Study also fails
to properly distinguish and identify the two essential elements of
custom: usus and opinio juris.58 While acknowledging the requirement
for opinio juris, the CIHL Study’s methodology effectively dismisses it,59
thereby removing the most articulate and nuanced expression of state
sovereignty—the privilege of the sovereign to express the will of the
state. Combined with the CIHL Study’s excessive reliance on military
manuals as sources of opinio juris—less indicative of a sense of a state’s
legal obligation than its policy execution—the methodology of the CIHL
Study creates a risk that customary international legal obligations may
be determined by military action alone.60 Bridging the gap between

confirmed on numerous occasions by the treaty bodies that have
analysed State behaviour, including during armed conflict, and by the
International Court of Justice . . . .
H ENCKAERTS & D OSWALD -B ECK, supra note 55, at xxxvi–xxxvii.
57
This appears to be part of the ICRC’s purpose in publishing the CIHL Study:
Knowledge of the rules of customary international law may also be of
service in a number of situations where reliance on customary
international law is required. This is especially relevant for the work
of courts and international organisations.
Indeed, courts are
frequently required to apply customary international law. This is the
case, for example, for the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia . . . .
Id. at xxxv–xxxvi (2005).
58
R ESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF THE F OREIGN R ELATIONS L AW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(4) cmt. c (1987) (“For a practice of states to become a rule of customary international
law it must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation (opinio
juris sive necessitatis); a practice that is generally followed but which states feel legally free
to disregard does not contribute to customary law.”).
59
H ENCKAERTS & D OSWALD -B ECK, supra note 55, at xlvi (“During work on the study it
proved very difficult and largely theoretical to strictly separate elements of practice and
[opinio juris]. More often than not, one and the same act reflects [both] . . . . When there is
sufficiently dense practice, an opinio juris is generally contained within that practice and, as
a result, it is not usually necessary to demonstrate separately the existence of an opinio
juris.”).
60
See Letter from John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, & William J.
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, President, Int’l
Comm. of the Red Cross (Nov. 3, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2006/
98860.htm. Ironically, the Study goes on three pages later to emphasize the vital
importance of opinio juris by quoting the Continental Shelf Case:
It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international
law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris
of States, even though multilateral conventions may have an important
role to play in recording and defining rules deriving from custom, or
indeed in developing them.
H ENCKAERTS & D OSWALD -B ECK, supra note 55, at xlix (quoting Continental Shelf (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, 29–30 (June 3)).
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what the law is and what the ICRC believes the law should be,61 the CIHL
Study distorts the formative method of customary law.
The ICRC’s DPH Guidance also merges the fields of law in war and
human rights.62 The DPH Guidance draws its title and subject matter
from Article 51 of Additional Protocol I (“AP I”),63 which addresses the
protection of civilians from attack “unless and for such time as they take
a direct part in hostilities.”64 Despite broad consensus on most issues,
the members of the panel of civilian and military experts convened to
formulate the recommendations in the DPH Guidance parted company
with each other on Recommendation IX of the final report:
In addition to the restraints imposed by international
humanitarian law on specific means and methods of
warfare, and without prejudice to further restrictions
that may arise under other applicable branches of
international law, the kind and degree of force which is
permissible against persons not entitled to protection
against direct attack must not exceed what is actually
necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in
the prevailing circumstances.65
Careful deconstruction of this language reveals the reason for the
disagreement: Despite assertions that the DPH Guidance focused
exclusively on the law of war,66 Recommendation IX is based on
graduated use of force derived from human rights law,67 where the use
of graduated force tailored to specific risk is common in law enforcement
circles.

61
See Major J. Jeremy Marsh, Lex Lata or Lex Ferenda? Rule 45 of the ICRC Study on
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 198 MIL. L. R EV. 116 (2008) (discussing one rule
within the CIHL Study as part of broader critique that the Study states not what the law is,
but what the ICRC wants it to be).
62
See I NTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 55.
63
Additional Protocol I, supra note 46, art. 51(3).
64
Id.
65
I NTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 55, at 77.
66
See id. at 11 (“Moreover, although the Interpretive Guidance is concerned with IHL
only, its conclusions remain without prejudice to an analysis of questions related to direct
participation in hostilities under other applicable branches of international law, such as
human rights law . . . .”).
67
This recommendation deeply divided the panel of experts on whose advice and
contributions the ICRC so heavily relied in creating the Guidance. In fact, when Dr. Melzer
proceeded with the recommendation despite vocal objection from members of the panel,
many members requested that their names not be associated with the work. See generally
Parks, supra note 2 (providing a first-hand account of this disagreement).
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Similar transference of human rights norms occurs within
deliberative bodies at the UN, which have commissioned significant
reports that fail to properly apply the correct body of law. The UN
Human Rights Committee has received reports assimilating a
complementary view of the laws of war and human rights.68 Likewise,
the UN Human Rights Committee, responsible for monitoring State
compliance with the ICCPR, has long viewed the interplay between the
laws of war and human rights as complementary.69 As demonstrated by
the international and domestic court cases discussed in the next section,
merging the laws of war and human rights is underway in the judiciary
as well.
D. International and Domestic Court Interpretations
Convergence of the laws of war and human rights is also rising in
international and American judicial landscapes. In the Nuclear Weapons
Case, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) held that the protections
against arbitrary deprivation of the right to life under Article 6 of the
ICCPR did “not cease in times of war,” except as specifically provided
for under the treaty.70 The court further noted that the law of war would
operate as lex specialis in determining whether a deprivation of life is
arbitrary under the ICCPR.71 However, the court provided little
meaningful guidance on resolving conflict between the two norms,
noting that the identified right applies “[i]n principle,”72 and leaving
aside the vital questions of how, to what extent, and whether other
provisions of the ICCPR might also reach armed conflict. The vagueness

68
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶
29, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by PHILIP ALSTON ) (“Both IHL and
human rights law apply in the context of armed conflict; whether a particular killing is
legal is determined by the applicable lex specialis. To the extent that IHL does not provide a
rule, or the rule is unclear and its meaning cannot be ascertained from the guidance offered
by IHL principles, it is appropriate to draw guidance from human rights law.” (footnote
omitted)).
69
See U.N. Office of the High Comm’r. for Hum. Rts., General Comment No. 06: The Right
to Life (Art. 6) (Apr. 30, 1982), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
(Symbol)/84ab9690ccd81fc7c12563ed0046fae3?Opendocument (analyzing state obligations
to prevent arbitrary deprivation of life).
70
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
240 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Case].
71
Id.
72
Id. The resulting confusion means advocates for both broad reading of lex specialis and
complementarity can cite this case with confidence—still another reason to clarify the law
in this area.
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left some to speculate that, when the more specific of the two, human
rights law—and not the law of war—might be the lex specialis.73
The court addressed similar questions in Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (“the Wall
Case”),74 after Israel had denied application of several human rights
instruments due to ongoing armed conflict in the occupied territory.75
Here, the ICJ fragmented the application of human rights law in armed
conflict into three scenarios:
As regards the relationship between international
humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus
three possible situations:
some rights may be
exclusively matters of international humanitarian law;
others may be exclusively matters of human rights law;
yet others may be matters of both these branches of
international law. In order to answer the question put to
it, the Court will have to take into consideration both
these branches of international law, namely human
rights law and, as lex specialis, international
humanitarian law.76
Other than reaffirming its position in the Nuclear Weapons Case, the ICJ
opinion in the Wall Case did little to clarify the issue in a meaningful
way.77 Rather, the Wall Case identified an already-plain practical overlap
between the two paradigms that the law has yet to reconcile.
This permissive but unstructured judicial approach to reconciling
human rights norms in cases before international courts made it
inevitable that similar problems would migrate into U.S. courts.78
Nancie Prud’homme puts it this way:
[I]nternational humanitarian law and international human rights law
could both be either the lex specialis or lex generalis, depending on the
situation at hand. Practically speaking, lex specialis and lex generalis
would be interpreted or applied in such a way that, for instance,
human rights law would prevail over humanitarian law as regard to
judicial guarantees.
Prud’homme, supra note 14, at 374.
74
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9) [hereinafter the Wall Case].
75
Prud’homme, supra note 14, at 377.
76
Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 178.
77
See Prud’homme, supra note 14, at 378.
78
The bedrock documents on which the United States was founded—the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution—are human rights documents with international reach
of their own. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J.
I NT’ L L. 43, 54 (2004) (“The U.S. Constitution served as a principal inspiration and model
73
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Detainees captured on the battlefield, or otherwise subject to U.S. efforts
in the war on terror, have turned to the traditional human rights
mechanism of the courtroom in droves, bringing cases involving
targeted killing,79 detention,80 and adjudicative rights.81 In Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that U.S. citizens have a right to bring
habeas corpus petitions to challenge detention that originated during
armed conflict.82 Two years later, the Court found similar access to the
courts was required for a Yemeni national who also had been seized in
combat.83 Again in 2008, the Court held in Boumediene v. Bush that a
prisoner at Guantánamo Bay had the right to challenge his detention
through habeas proceedings.84
These cases are less remarkable for their individual holdings than for
the general proposition that a human rights framework was used to
reach boldly (and successfully) into the armed conflict architecture. The
outcome of this litigation, on the merits of individual cases and as a
trend,85 is further indication of the need for nuanced reconciliation of the
laws of war and human rights. It seems apparent that a significant body
of law will emerge from that process.86 However, given that those cases
are pending before courts accustomed to balancing competing interests
in a human rights law paradigm, it seems equally apparent that the
historical tactical concerns in the law of war will be underrepresented.
“Nature abhors a vacuum, and will act to fill it.”87 But the United
States stands to lose more than empty space when these competing
normative frameworks are reconciled with soft law and the advocacy of
non-sovereign actors whose interests are rooted in advocacy or the

for many foreign and international constitutions and covenants, including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights
and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.”).
79
See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
80
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
81
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
82
542 U.S. 507, 597–99 (2004).
83
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 557.
84
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723.
85
See, e.g., B ENJAMIN WITTES ET AL ., THE E MERGING L AW OF D ETENTION : THE
GUANTÁNAMO
H ABEAS
C ASES
AS
L AWMAKING
(2010),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_c
hesney/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.pdf (summarizing cases, outcomes, and trends
in detainee habeas litigation).
86
See id. at 3 (“The rules the judges craft could have profound implications for decisions
in the field concerning whether to initially detain, or even target, a given person . . . .”).
87
B ENEDICTUS D E SPINOZA , E THICS 15 (G.H.R. Parkinson ed., Andrew Boyle trans., The
Guernsey Press Co. 1993).
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academy.88 Ultimately, the influence of human rights law in armed
conflict shifts more risk onto combat personnel, the result of which will
invariably include more casualties.89 Nowhere is this pattern more
evident than in counterinsurgency operations.
III. THE CALCULUS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN
“As long as the rules of the game are observed, it is
permissible [in armed conflict] to cause suffering, deprivation
of freedom, and death.”90
Professor Meron’s pronouncement of law is technically correct but at
tactical odds with counterinsurgency warfare,91 which closes the gap
between the laws of war and human rights dramatically at the tactical
level. The tempo of convergence is illustrated by the differences between
tactics employed in Kosovo in the late 1990s, and the conduct of
counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan less than ten years later.92
Commanders in Kosovo avoided North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(“NATO”) casualties by employing an air campaign conducted at high
altitude to avoid enemy air defenses. Operational focus on protecting
coalition forces, while ultimately effective in compelling Yugoslavia’s

See Anderson, supra note 31, at 25–27 (discussing the legal, diplomatic, and practical
costs of complacency in the face of various pressures applied on the United States’
interpretation of legal rights and obligations).
89
U.S. forces already assume risk in combat as part of the “basic bargain” for those
engaged in international armed conflict:
Engage lawfully in combat and, if captured, you will receive the
comprehensive treatment protections of the Convention. Ignore the
laws of war, and you cannot seek the status given to lawful
combatants. POW status is perhaps best seen then as an incentive to
follow the rules in armed conflict. It also is a way to protect civilians
more effectively: [W]hen combatants masquerade as civilians to
mislead the enemy and avoid detection, civilian suffering increases as
a tragic consequence of the failure of these combatants to adhere to the
fundamental law of war principle of distinction between combatants
and the civilian population.
John B. Bellinger, III, Legal Adviser, Postings on Opinio Juris Blog, STATE.GOV (Jan. 2007),
http://www.state.gov/s/l/2007/116111.htm.
90
Meron, supra note 1, at 240 (emphasis added).
91
See FM 3-24, supra note 2 (“Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political,
economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”
(citation omitted)).
92
Paul Robinson, ‘Ready to Kill But Not to Die’: NATO Strategy in Kosovo, 54 I NT’ L J. 671,
672 (1999). (“The main characteristic of NATO’s conduct of the war in Kosovo was a desire
to avoid friendly casualties.”). This method was reviled as “a coward’s strategy.” Id. at 673
(quoting Gwynne Dwyer, MONTREAL GAZETTE, May 11, 1999, at B3).
88
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submission to NATO demands,93 was later criticized on grounds that it
shifts “the war away from military targets and onto civilian ones.”94
That pendulum has come full swing in Afghanistan, where ground
troops are the favored method of combat, subject to heavy restrictions in
the employment of air and artillery assets to avoid civilian casualties.95
This doctrine shifts risk, much as human rights advocates have
encouraged, with significant implications for the state practice necessary
to formation of customary international law.
A. Human Rights as Military Doctrine
“We’re attacking to seize control of the population from the
Taliban. The people are our objective.”96
In traditional armed conflict, talk of making civilians “the objective”
would generate immediate uproar; in counterinsurgency, it is a mantra.97
Counterinsurgency dominates the doctrinal approach to fighting in Iraq
and Afghanistan.98 Although counterinsurgency itself is nothing new, its
meteoric rise to prominence in military doctrine in recent years has
brought about a “radical revolution in warfare” that draws together the
laws of war and human rights.99 The works of Kilcullen,100 Nagl,101 and
O’Neill102 all contributed in some measure to the current

Id. at 678.
Id. at 681.
95
See, e.g., apps. B–D (Tactical Directives of Generals McKiernan, McChrystal, and
Petraeus).
96
See Obama’s War, PBS FRONTLINE , http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
obamaswar/etc/script.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (emphasis added) (presenting a
transcript of comments of Lieutenant Colonel Christian Cabaniss, speaking to the Marines
of 2d Battalion 8th Marines in early July 2009, the night prior to a heliborne assault into
territory held by the Taliban).
97
FM 3-24, supra note 2, ¶ 2-4 (“Regaining the populace’s active and continued support
for the [host nation] government is essential to deprive an insurgency of its power and
appeal. The military forces’ primary function in [counterinsurgency] is protecting that
populace.”).
98
While the law of war and counterinsurgency are relevant topics to combat operations
in both of these countries, this Article is focused on applying these principles in
Afghanistan.
99
Commander Matthew L. Beran, The Proportionality Balancing Test Revisited: How
Counterinsurgency Changes “Military Advantage,” ARMY L AW., Aug. 2010, at 10.
100
D AVID K ILCULLEN , C OUNTERINSURGENCY (2010).
101
JOHN A. N AGL, C OUNTERINSURGENCY L ESSONS FROM MALAYA AND VIETNAM:
L EARNING TO E AT SOUP WITH A K NIFE (2002). Mr. Nagl is a retired U.S. Army officer and
contributed to the Field Manual on counterinsurgency.
102
O’N EILL, supra note 3.
93
94
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counterinsurgency doctrine of the Army and Marine Corps, which
devotes an entire chapter to the merger of civilian and military efforts.103
Those efforts make many traditional human rights issues part and
parcel of the military mission.104 Current counterinsurgency doctrine
cites some aspect of human rights normative language nearly twenty
times: presuming application of human rights in war,105 assigning
counterinsurgents to train host nation personnel on interrogation
techniques,106 and addressing ethics in treatment of detainees.107 This
doctrine is implemented (and publicized) in Afghanistan through the
Tactical Directives. The next section examines that implementation.
B. Human Rights in the Tactical Directives
The first Tactical Directive to merge counterinsurgency in
Afghanistan with human rights norms was issued in December 2008, 108
and identified “[t]he support of the Afghan people for the [Government
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] and their collective support for
ISAF [as] critical to defeating the insurgency.”109 The Directive limited
ISAF searches of Afghan homes, mandated respect for Afghan culture
and religious practices, required special training and equipment to avoid
civilian casualties during the escalation of force incidents, and mandated
investigations of all civilian casualty incidents.110
FM 3-24, supra note 2, ¶ 2-2 (“The integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial
to successful COIN operations. All efforts focus on supporting the local populace and HN
government.”).
104
The following issues sound more similar to domestic governance than warfare:
Counterinsurgents take upon themselves responsibility for the
people’s well-being in all its manifestations. These include . . .
•
Security from insurgent intimidation and coercion, as well as
from nonpolitical violence and crime,
•
Provision for basic economic needs,
•
Provision of essential services, such as water, electricity,
sanitation, and medical care,
•
Sustainment of key social and cultural institutions, [and]
•
Other aspects that contribute to a society’s basic quality of
life.
Id. ¶ 2-6.
105
Id. ¶ 1-132 (“Any human rights abuses or legal violations committed by U.S. forces
quickly become known throughout the local populace and eventually around the world.”).
106
Id. ¶ 6-100 (“[Host nation] personnel should be trained to handle and interrogate
detainees and prisoners according to internationally recognized human rights norms.”).
107
Id. ¶ 7-25 (“Soldiers and Marines treat noncombatants and detainees humanely,
according to American values and internationally recognized human rights standards.”).
108
See infra McKiernan Tactical Directive, app. B.
109
Id. at app. B, at B–834.
110
The implementation of this requirement as doctrine imposes a much heavier standard
than the customary obligation to investigate war crimes found at Rule 158 of the ICRC
103
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On replacing General David McKiernan in May 2009,111 General
Stanley McChrystal issued a much more restrictive Tactical Directive,
which further embedded human rights concepts into counterinsurgency
operations and indexed those norms to legal obligations.112 Describing
excessive damage and civilian casualties as “strategic defeats,”113 the
Directive mandates additional scrutiny and limitations on the use of
close air support on residential compounds, prohibiting the employment
of these fires except under specified conditions.114 This Directive had a
significant impact on combat operations in Afghanistan.115 Less than one
year later, General Petraeus assumed command and continued this
trend,116 prohibiting certain fires unless “the commander . . . determine[s]
that no civilians are present.”117
This momentous shift toward a law enforcement human rights
paradigm is not solely theoretical: Restrictions on the employment of
fires allocates additional risk to the counterinsurgent,118 making combat
significantly more dangerous than it would be if only the law of war

Study. See H ENCKAERTS & D OSWALD -B ECK, supra note 55, at 607 (identifying a
requirement under customary law mandating states investigate war crimes committed by
its nationals, on its territory, or otherwise subject to its jurisdiction).
111
General McKiernan, “viewed as somewhat cautious and conventionally minded,” was
replaced less than one year into his tour as Commander of ISAF (“COMISAF”). Ann Scott
Tyson, Top U.S. Commander in Afghanistan is Fired, COMMON DREAMS (May 12, 2009),
http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2009/05/12-0.
General McChrystal was
favored for the Afghan counterinsurgency command due to his extensive Special
Operations background. Id.
112
See infra McChrystal Tactical Directive, app. C, at C–836.
113
Id.
114
Id. at C-837.
115
This assertion is based on the Author’s professional experiences as Battalion Judge
Advocate, 2d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, during combat operations in Helmand
Province, Afghanistan from May 26 to November 15, 2009. The Author was personally
responsible for training Marines on the applicable Tactical Directives. Some of those
Marines believed that the requirements of the Tactical Directives in place at the time were
excessively procedural, and might result in unacceptable delays in delivery of artillery and
close air support in combat operations, especially in cases involving imminent hostile
threats. It merits mention that a single minute exposed to enemy fire is infinitely longer
than a minute in the safety of one’s own kitchen.
116
See generally infra Petraeus Tactical Directive, app. D.
117
Id. at D-840 (emphasis added). But see Additional Protocol I, supra note 46, at art
51(5)(b). Of note, this restriction forecloses a commander’s authority under the law of war
to balance the loss of civilian lives in light of the concrete and direct military advantage to
be gained.
118
U.S. doctrine also recognizes Rules of Engagement such as the Tactical Directives as a
potential source of combat operational stress, a separate element of delayed risk. See JOINT
C HIEFS OF STAFF, J OINT PUB. 1-02, D EPARTMENT OF D EFENSE D ICTIONARY OF M ILITARY
AND A SSOCIATED T ERMS 60 (2010).
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applied.119 The driving focus on the protection of that population has
required counterinsurgent forces to forego latitude offered by the law of
war and assume more risk for themselves by restricting the use of
force—both in offensive targeting and in self-defense.120
This tactical merger of the laws of war and human rights may result
in “operationalizing” the law in armed conflict,121 but imposing rules
significantly more stringent than required by the law of war carries a
separate scheme of risk: “Tactical goals of reducing or eliminating
civilian casualties in Afghanistan have led the United States to forego the
balancing inherent in a proportionality assessment in favor of a mandate
to protect civilians at all cost.”122 This is precisely the case with the
Tactical Directives issued by the last three ISAF commanders, and is a
fundamental shift not just in how we regard the enemy, but in how we
regard ourselves. Counterinsurgency has also called into question the
method by which we calculate advantage in combat—an essential
element of proportionality.123
While the proportionality test has never amounted to a simple
stacking of bodies or benefits on either side of a scale,124
counterinsurgency’s focus on protection of the local population makes
even the unintentional killing of a civilian the close companion of defeat.
Commander Matthew Beran suggests that the nature of
counterinsurgency essentially doubles the weight to be accorded a
civilian death.125 While it may be difficult to precisely measure the shift
in weights on this balance, it is equally important to observe that the
practice of applying this different method of weighing collateral
damage—regardless of quantum—may amount to an aspect of state
practice in the context of customary international law.

FM 3-24, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 7-27–7-29.
See Int’l Sec. Assistance Force, ISAF Revises Tactical Directive, NATO (July 6, 2009),
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2009/07/pr090706-tactical-directive.html
(“Protecting Afghan civilians is ISAF’s top priority. The tactical directive continues the
long-standing ISAF focus on protecting civilians and operating in a manner that is
respectful of Afghan culture.”); see also HEADQUARTERS, INT’L SEC. ASSISTANCE FORCE,
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN, TACTICAL DIRECTIVE OF July 6, 2009, available at
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf (providing
tactical guidance and listing the ISAF’s goals). The versions reproduced at the appendices
to this Article are those available to the public and are the unclassified summaries of the
Tactical Directives.
121
Blank & Guiora, supra note 15, at 48.
122
Id. at 68.
123
See Beran, supra note 99, at 10.
124
O PERATIONAL L AW H ANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 12.
125
Beran, supra note 99, at 9.
119
120
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C. Counterinsurgency as Custom
To ripen into customary international law, a state practice must be
consistent and anchored in the belief that such practice is what the law
requires.126 State actions undertaken as policy do not meet this
standard.127 In this regard, international law is inherently positivist in
nature—absent an affirmatively identified binding custom or treaty,
“[r]estrictions upon the independence of [s]tates cannot therefore be
presumed.”128
This maxim has been memorialized in the celebrated “Martens
Clause” of Additional Protocol I, which resolves gaps in the positive
language of the laws of war by permitting both civilians and combatants
to resort to custom for guidance.129 The ICRC commentary on this issue
is helpful:
In other words, when the Parties to the conflict do not
clash with a formal prohibition of law of armed conflict,
they can act freely within the bounds of the principles of
international law, i.e., they have the benefit of a freedom
which is not arbitrary but within the framework of law.
When they come up against a formal prohibition, they
cannot invoke military necessity to derogate from it.
When this possibility is explicitly provided for, the
Parties to the conflict can only invoke it to the extent that
it is provided for.
This principle and these concepts are meant to be
applied in practice. This is almost always where the

R ESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF THE F OREIGN R ELATIONS L AW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) cmt. c (1987) (“For a practice of states to become a rule of customary international
law it must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation (opinio
juris sive necessitatis); a practice that is generally followed but which states feel legally free
to disregard does not contribute to customary law.”).
127
Id.
128
SS. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., (ser. A) No. 10, ¶ 44 (Sept. 7). “International
law governs relations between independent [s]tates. The rules of law binding upon [s]tates
therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages
generally accepted as expressing principles of law . . . .” Id.
129
The “Martens Clause” is found in Article I, paragraph 2 of Additional Protocol I:
In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and
authority of the principles of international law derived from
established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the
dictates of public conscience.
COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at art. 1, ¶ 2.
126
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difficulties begin. It has been argued that the principle is
clear but the concepts are vague.130
Current counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan are
establishing affirmative state practice, proving the ability to apply
normative human rights law concepts on the battlefield. In addition, the
Tactical Directives in some cases make reference to a sense of legal
obligation in doing so.131 Considering the methodology of the CIHL
Study and the DPH Guidance, the ICRC and others would likely argue
these operations have already established customary obligations to some
extent. This is cause for some concern, given the ICRC’s intent that
tribunals should weigh its studies in allocating international
obligation.132
That is not to say, however, that the point is or should be conceded.
Counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in Afghanistan may, over time,
ripen into a set of rules of customary international law. However,
current mission requirements should not dictate future mission
capabilities—the fact that we fight this way now should not require us to
fight this way forever.133 To clarify the applicable legal framework and
foreclose current practice from ripening into rules of customary law, the
United States should take this opportunity to revisit the gaps between
these norms. The next section proposes means and methods of doing so.
IV. U.S. RESPONSE TO MERGER IN TREATY AND CUSTOM
“The United States would be best served if the Obama
Administration did that exceedingly rare thing in
international law and diplomacy: Getting the United States
out in front of the issue by making plain the American
position, rather than merely reacting in surprise when its
sovereign prerogatives are challenged by the international
soft-law community.”134

See id. at art. 35, ¶¶ 1389–90.
See infra McChrystal Tactical Directive, app. C, at C–836.
132
See H ENCKAERTS & D OSWALD -B ECK, supra note 55; see also supra text accompanying
note 59.
133
While non-state terrorism remains an imminent threat to national security, it is far
from certain that all future conflicts will engage this type of enemy. As the Director of
National Intelligence has recently indicated, nations with conventional forces remain
threats as well. See Eli Lake, China Deemed Biggest Threat to U.S., WASH . TIMES (Mar. 11,
2011),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/10/china-deemed-biggestthreat-to-us/?page=all.
134
Anderson, supra note 31, at 32.
130
131
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The conceptual merger of the laws of war and human rights may be
fruitful both in terms of extending the humanitarian objectives of both
regimes and in clarifying the applicable framework in a meaningful and
utilitarian way. As this Article has shown, merging these two systems
piecemeal carries unacceptable tactical and legal risks. The best path
forward includes harmonized employment of domestic law, custom and
treaty, and reconsideration of the traditional view that multilateralism is
the sine qua non of legitimacy.135
A. Minilateralism
Minilateralism is the practice of “bring[ing] to the table the smallest
possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact
on solving a particular problem.”136 Fewer competing interests increases
negotiation tempo and precludes dilution of the treaty’s purpose, a
The multilateral
common concern in multilateral negotiations.137
dilution effect and its tactical consequences are on prominent display
with the ISAF in Afghanistan,138 where a multitude of Troop
Contributing Nations (“TCNs”) with varying Rules of Engagement have
established a practice that is as unwieldy as it is unfair.139 The ISAF
structure is less representative of sovereign equality than the strategic
security forming the motivational base for the specially-affected states
contributing troops.
135
This Article refers to “multilateralism” as a treaty regime that includes a large number
of states as a party; the more apt term is likely “megalateralism,” referring to large regimes
organizations such as NATO and the UN.
136
Naìm, supra note 9.
137
Other regimes have been discussed in the past to overcome similar differences:
“[Á] la carte multilateralism” involves coalitions that will vary in size
and composition depending on the issue at hand, with the only
constant being that the coalitions are formed and led by the United
States. From Washington’s perspective, this approach would seem to
offer several advantages: it largely avoids problems of institutional
blockage, such as those that can occur within the UN Security Council;
it allows for the limitation of new initiatives to small groups of likeminded states, with the group then being expanded once momentum
has been achieved; and it enables the United States to focus its
persuasive efforts on those most able and willing to assist with respect
to any given matter.
Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative, 98 AM. J. I NT’ L L.
526, 543–44 (2004) (footnote omitted). Minilateralism has similar objectives but as a term is
more descriptive of goals of the approach.
138
ISAF was formed by a resolution of the UN Security Council in late 2001. See S.C. Res.
1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES1386 (Dec. 20, 2001).
139
As of March 4, 2011, ISAF currently totals 132,203 troops, of which 90,000 are U.S.
forces. Int’l Sec. Assistance Force: Key Facts and Figures, ISAF, http://www.isaf.nato.int/
images/stories/File/Placemats/20100303%20Placemat.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
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Specially-affected states are those, which, by virtue of geography or
some other factor closely related to the question of law at issue, have a
heightened interest in the outcome of that question as compared to other
states.140 This doctrine is recognized by international courts and has
been asserted by the United States in response to the CIHL study.141 In
fact, the CIHL Study expressly recognizes the concept of speciallyaffected states in its introduction,142 and implicitly recognizes this
doctrine in the methodology of its conduct of the study.143
Recent commentary reveals how specially-affected states are
especially well-suited to be agents of change through the institution of
successful minilateral regimes:
The pattern is clear: Since the early 1990s, the need for
effective multicountry collaboration has soared, but at
the same time multilateral talks have inevitably failed;
deadlines have been missed; financial commitments and
promises have not been honored; execution has stalled;
and international collective action has fallen far short of
what was offered and, more importantly, needed. These
failures represent not only the perpetual lack of
international consensus, but also a flawed obsession
with multilateralism as the panacea for all the world’s
ills.144

But see MARK E. VILLIGER, C USTOMARY I NTERNATIONAL L AW AND TREATIES 13
(1985) (questioning the doctrine of specially-affected states).
141
Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 60; see also Anderson, supra note 31, at 32
(“International law traditionally, after all, accepts that states with particular interests,
power, and impact in the world, carry more weight in particular matters than other states.
The American view of maritime law matters more than does landlocked Bolivia’s.
American views on international security law, as the core global provider of security,
matter more than do those of Argentina, Germany or, for that matter, NGOs or academic
commentators. But it has to speak—and speak loudly—if it wishes to be heard.”).
142
H ENCKAERTS & D OSWALD -B ECK, supra note 55, at xxxix.
143
The introduction notes the selection method of the states involved in the CIHL Study:
“On the basis of geographical representation and experience of armed conflict, [certain
states] were selected for an in-depth study of national practice on international
humanitarian law by a local expert.” H ENCKAERTS & D OSWALD -B ECK, supra note 55, at lv.
That list of states included: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic
of Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Russian Federation, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom, United
States, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe. Id. But see Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 60
(criticizing the CIHL Study for not properly accounting for specially-affected states).
144
Naìm, supra note 9.
140
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This observation stands in stark contrast to the continued diplomatic
pursuit of legitimacy through consensus—a “fool’s errand” writ large
across the current battlefield in Afghanistan.145 Rather than seek broad
consensus, U.S. policy should focus on achieving a critical mass of
legitimacy that is lawful and rooted in an operational approach.
This approach is not without its limitations. Minilateralism has
previously been criticized as “a fig leaf for unilateralism.”146 Prudent
minilateral regimes must therefore build an effective consensus among
states with clear and legitimate policy objectives. From the United
States’ perspective, any minilateral solution must likewise preserve not
only the inherent right to self-defense under the UN Charter, but must
also preserve the inherent right to self-defense on which the United
States has relied in the past.147 As noted academic and scholar Kenneth
Anderson has explained, past attempts to establish a statutory
framework for targeted killing “have come and gone without fruition
with regularity over the decades.”148 There is no reason to believe that
the establishment of a multilateral solution will be any less politically or
diplomatically difficult. It remains a worthy undertaking nonetheless.
Finally, it merits mention that a minilateral solution (or a multilateral
one, for that matter) might find acceptance among a body of states who,
though currently bound to some aspects of the law of war as custom,
might seek to supersede those obligations by treaty. Withdrawing from
customary international law is controversial,149 whereas it is wellestablished that states may override customary obligations by executing
a treaty with contrary provisions.150 In the meantime, the President may
use inherent constitutional authority to establish a demonstrative
Id.
See David Rothkopf, Roll Up Your Pants, Time to Wade Back into “Minilateralism” . . . ,
FOREIGN POL ’ Y (June 25, 2009), http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/06/25/
roll_up_your_pants_time_to_wade_back_into_minilateralism (“Bush ‘minilateralism’ was
just a fig leaf for unilateralism, ‘coalitions of the willing’ simply described the small group
of countries we managed to pull together to help advance U.S. policy to create the illusion
of something truly multilateral and thus ok in the eyes of the international community. But
of course, these coalitions were shallow, half-hearted and had a half-life roughly akin to
that of a basket of raspberries. (Which last, mold-free, in my experience here in
Washington, almost until you get them from the store into your car.”)).
147
See generally Anderson, supra note 31 (arguing that the use of targeted killings is
proper in self-defense).
148
Id. at 34.
149
Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 Y ALE L.J.
202, 211 (2010).
150
Id. at 211 n.34 (“Clearly a treaty, when it first comes into force, overrides customary
law as between the parties to the treaty . . . .” (quoting PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (7th rev. ed. 1997) (alteration in
original)).
145
146
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framework for that minilateral regime. Regrettably, recent executive
issuances have proceeded both toward and away from a functional
approach.
B. Executive Authority and Custom
While merger of the laws of war and human rights by treaty or
custom may seem inevitable to some, executive authority provides the
most responsive means to begin incorporating terms and norms in a way
best calculated to serve both operational requirements and national
sovereignty.151 Executive Orders and documents such as the National
Security Strategy (“NSS”) offer significant opportunity to both command
the various aspects of the national security instruments and express
opinio juris as head of state.152
Executive Orders offer an effective means of direct presidential
communication on matters of international law. On his first full day in
office, President Obama issued three Executive Orders bearing directly
on the lawfulness of detention policy,153 two of which employed a
definitions section to invoke, and thereby restrict, their scope to the law
of war. The President’s more recent Executive Order directing periodic
review of detention at Guantánamo both repeats and expands that
restriction,154 making the Order applicable in cases under review as “law
of war detention” or those being referred for prosecution.155
Collectively, these orders express the United States’ view that its
detention practices are governed by the law of war, but retain the
possibility of civilian prosecution.
However, the announcement,156 which accompanied Executive
Order 13,567, sends a different message that may carry more force under
international law than the Executive Order itself. That the President
151
See, e.g., Proclamation No. 2667, 64 Fed. Reg. 48,701 (Sept. 28, 1945). The “Truman
Proclamation” launched a trend of significant extension of coastal state jurisdiction. See
MARK W. JANIS & J OHN E. N OYES , I NTERNATIONAL L AW: C ASES AND C OMMENTARY 549–
52 (2d ed. 2001).
152
THE WHITE HOUSE, N ATIONAL SECURITY S TRATEGY (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.
pdf.
153
See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 22, 2009) (invoking military
regulations, domestic laws, and treaty provisions under the law of war in imposing
standards for interrogation); Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009)
(invoking law of war treaties in directing review of cases involving detainees held at
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba); Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,901 (Jan. 22, 2009)
(establishing an interagency task force to review detention policy options).
154
See Exec. Order 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7, 2011).
155
Id. § 1.
156
Fact Sheet, supra note 12.
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encouraged the Senate to provide its advice and consent to Additional
But the distinct language of the
Protocol I is no surprise.157
announcement employs terms of art appear to bind the United States to
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I as a matter of customary international
law.158 Given that much of this provision is distilled from the ICCPR,159
the customary application of Article 75 would represent a profound
departure from the longstanding national policy noted elsewhere in this
Article, and would significantly expand the nation’s legal obligations.
The nature and scope of that expansion is uncertain.
To some extent, the President’s statement that the United States will
regard Article 75 (and the corresponding portions of the ICCPR) as a
matter of legal obligation answers the questions of some critics who
objected that there was “no intelligible principle for determining which
provisions [of the ICCPR] are incorporated [into the law of war] and
which are not.”160 It is far from certain that the announcement answers
those critics in a constructive way, as there remains significant confusion
on the meaning of these changes. This announcement has already
157
See John Bellinger, Further Thoughts on the White House Statement About Article 75,
L AWFARE (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/03/further-thoughts-onthe-white-house-statement-about-article-75/ (noting that, despite rejection of the
remainder of Additional Protocol I on other grounds, it had long been the position of the
United States that the provisions of Article 75 were sound).
158
Compare Fact Sheet, supra note 12 (“The U.S. Government will therefore choose out of
a sense of legal obligation to treat the principles set forth in Article 75 [of Additional
Protocol I] as applicable to any individual it detains in an international armed
conflict . . . .”), with R ESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF THE F OREIGN R ELATIONS L AW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102(2) cmt. c (1987) (“For a practice of states to become a rule of
customary international law it must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense
of legal obligation . . . .”).
159
The drafting of Article 75:
was guided by the work done on Protocol II during the second session
of the Conference. Committee III decided to include in Article 65
(which has become Article 75) the text drawn up for Articles 4
(Fundamental guarantees) and 6 (Penal prosecutions) of Protocol II, except
where there was a good reason to change the wording in view of the
fact that Protocol I deals with international and not non-international
conflicts. It should be recalled that Articles 4 (Fundamental guarantees)
and 6 (Penal prosecutions) of Protocol II reproduce, in some cases word
for word, the corresponding provisions of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights . . . .
C OMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 865, art. 75, ¶ 3005.
160
Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 832.
Selected provisions of the ICCPR are held to be applicable to situations
of armed conflict, but no intelligible principle for determining which
provisions are incorporated and which are not is apparent, and no
evidence seems to suggest that the state parties to the ICCPR intended
some, but not others, of its provisions to apply in those circumstances.
Id.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss3/4

Pedden: Lex Lacunae: The Merging Laws of War and Human Rights in Counter

2012]

Lex Lacunae

831

generated vigorous discussion among legal scholars, not all of whom
agree with this Author’s reading of the President’s remarks.161
Former legal adviser to the Department of State John Bellinger
concludes that while the President’s statement accompanying Executive
Order 13,567 was significant, it did not conclusively establish that Article
75 now constituted binding customary international law.162 Rather, Mr.
Bellinger argued that the President has chosen as a matter of policy to
establish a leadership role in “attempting to create customary
international law through state practice.”163 Commenting further on the
matter, Mr. Bellinger maintained his position with respect to the noncustomary nature of Article 75, but encouraged the President to clarify
the meaning of the statement and whether its language indicates that this
treaty language from the law of war would apply to detainees currently
held at Guantánamo because its “ambiguity has confused both the
[a]dministration’s supporters and critics.”164
One might argue whether Mr. Bellinger correctly concludes that the
body of practice is insufficient to establish Article 75 as customary law,
given 170 states are party and an extensive body of state practice to
interpret. However, the President’s statement leaves this and other
questions unanswered. What remains abundantly clear is that piecemeal
incorporation of human rights obligations through Executive Order
13,567 and the statement that accompanied it have increased confusion,
even among notable experts, as to which body of law will apply—the
law of war, or the law of human rights.
V. CONCLUSION
The laws of war and human rights do not share the same world
view, and no amount of fighting—on the battlefield or in the academy—
will change that. Despite the fundamental differences between their
161
See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, My Last Word on Article 75, L AWFARE (Mar. 14, 2011), http:
//www.lawfareblog.com/2011/03/my-last-word-on-article-75/ (summarizing various
arguments on the precise meaning of the terms used in the Fact Sheet, whether Article 75 is
applicable to non-international armed conflict, and whether current U.S. practices are
already in keeping with Article 75).
162
John Bellinger, Obama’s Announcements on International Law, L AWFARE (Mar. 8, 2011),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/03/obamas-announcements-on-international-law/#
more-1523. Many in the international community will take issue with Mr. Bellinger’s
conclusion as to the customary nature of Article 75, given that there are 170 states that are
party to Additional Protocol I. See International Humanitarian Law—Treaties & Documents,
INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO?OpenView (last visited
Mar. 14, 2011) (providing a list of states that are party to treaties, including Additional
Protocol I).
163
Bellinger, supra note 157.
164
Id.
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respective fields of application, the two paradigms stand shoulder to
shoulder in current counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. Such
close proximity has done much to erode the distinction between the laws
of war and human rights. Given that current operations are the stuff of
which state practice is made, blurring the distinction between the two
fields is more than merely academic—it carries with it the threat of
ripening into a matter of binding customary international law.
Examples of this state practice abound both on the battlefield and the
home-front. In combat, military forces apply normative concepts of
human rights in the execution of missions, and standards for traditional
law of war decisions now contain terms derived from legal systems,
which are inextricably rooted in human rights law. Detainees captured
on the battlefield petition, not commanders, but domestic civilian
courts—institutions whose conceptual framework is drawn from human
rights law. Likewise, recent pronouncements by the president also
merge these two fields of law.
Unfortunately, all of these actors merge the laws of war and human
rights in different and therefore confusing ways. As the lead state
contributor of combat power in the Afghan counterinsurgency, the
United States has vital security, policy, and international legal interests
at stake. Those interests are not well-served permitting the haphazard
merger of two disparate bodies of law. Ultimately, it is the warfighters
and civilians at the tactical level of war who pay the price for this lack of
clarity.
To protect those persons and better serve the purpose of existing
treaties and customary international law, the United States should take a
leadership role in clarifying the law in those areas in which a merger of
norms is appropriate, and steadfastly objecting to the imposition of
human rights norms where the law of war will admit no compromise.
Our nation’s heroes, and the civilians they are often called upon to
protect, are well-deserving of law and policy as clear as the dangers they
face in combat.
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Public International Law Framework: Influence and
Gaps165

State
Practice

Opinio
Juris

Advocacy

165
This diagram is derived from a lecture delivered by Colonel William K. Lietzau,
USMC (Ret.), at the International Humanitarian Law conference hosted by the International
Committee of the Red Cross at Santa Clara University in January 2011. Colonel Lietzau
currently serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Detainee Policy), and appeared
at the conference in his capacity as a private citizen. Accordingly, the diagram represents
his personal views, and not necessarily those of the United States. The author is grateful
for Colonel Leitzau’s permission to incorporate that diagram into this Appendix and
Article.
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Tactical Directive—General McChrystal

NATO/ISAF UNCLASS
Headquarters
International Security Assistance Force
Kabul, Afghanistan
HQ ISAF
TO:
See Distribution
SUBJECT: Tactical Directive

6 July 2009

The Commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF), General Stanley McChrystal, issued a revised Tactical Directive
on 02 July 2009. The Tactical Directive provides guidance and intent for
the employment of force in support of ISAF operations and updates the
previous version issued by the previous commander in October 2008.
This directive also applies to all U.S. forces operating under the control
of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A).
Although the Tactical Directive has been classified for the protection of
our own forces, portions of the directive are being made public in order
to ensure a broader awareness of the intent and scope of General
McChrystal’s guidance to ISAF and USFOR-A forces.
Our strategic goal is to defeat the insurgency threatening the stability of
Afghanistan. Like any insurgency, there is a struggle for the support and
will of the population. Gaining and maintaining that support must be
our overriding operational imperative—and the ultimate objective of
every action we take.
What follows are the releasable portions of the Tactical Directive:
We must fight the insurgents, and will use the tools at our disposal to
both defeat the enemy and protect our forces. But we will not win based
on the number of Taliban we kill, but instead on our ability to separate
insurgents from the center of gravity—the people. That means we must
respect and protect the population from coercion and violence—and
operate in a manner which will win their support.
This is different from conventional combat, and how we operate will
determine the outcome more than traditional measures, like capture of
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terrain or attrition of enemy forces. We must avoid the trap of winning
tactical victories—but suffering strategic defeats—by causing civilian
casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the people.
While this is also a legal and a moral issue, it is an overarching
operational issue—clear-eyed recognition that loss of popular support
will be decisive to either side in this struggle. The Taliban cannot
militarily defeat us—but we can defeat ourselves.
I recognize that the carefully controlled and disciplined employment of
force entails risks to our troops—and we must work to mitigate that risk
wherever possible. But excessive use of force resulting in an alienated
population will produce far greater risks. We must understand this
reality at every level in our force.
I expect leaders at all levels to scrutinize and limit the use of force like
close air support (“CAS”) against residential compounds and other
locations likely to produce civilian casualties in accordance with this
guidance. Commanders must weigh the gain of using CAS against the
cost of civilian casualties, which in the long run make mission success
more difficult and turn the Afghan people against us.
I cannot prescribe the appropriate use of force for every condition that a
complex battlefield will produce, so I expect our force to internalize and
operate in accordance with my intent. Following this intent requires a
cultural shift within our forces – and complete understanding at every
level—down to the most junior soldiers. I expect leaders to ensure this is
clearly communicated and continually reinforced.
The use of air-to-ground munitions and indirect fires against residential
compounds is only authorized under very limited and prescribed
conditions (specific conditions deleted due to operational security).
(NOTE) This directive does not prevent commanders from protecting the
lives of their men and women as a matter of self-defense where it is
determined no other options (specific options deleted due to operational
security) are available to effectively counter the threat.
We will not isolate the population from us through our daily conduct or
execution of combat operations. Therefore:

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 [2012], Art. 4

838

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

Any entry into an Afghan house should always be
accomplished by Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF), with the support of local authorities, and
account for the unique cultural sensitivities toward local
women.
No ISAF forces will enter or fire upon, or fire into a
mosque or any religious or historical site except in selfdefense. All searches and entries for any other reason
will be conducted by ANSF.
The challenges in Afghanistan are complex and interrelated, and
counterinsurgencies are difficult to win. Nevertheless, we will win this
war. I have every confidence in the dedication and competence of the
members of our force to operate effectively within this challenging
environment. Working together with our Afghan partners, we can
overcome the enemy’s influence and give the Afghan people what they
deserve: a country at peace for the first time in three decades,
foundations of good governance, and economic development.
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Tactical Directive—General Petraeus

Headquarters
International Security Assistance Force—Afghanistan
2010-08-CA-004
KABUL, Afghanistan (Aug. 4)—International Security Assistance Force
Commander, General David Petraeus has issued his updated Tactical
Directive, providing guidance and intent for the use of force by ISAF and
USFOR-A units operating in Afghanistan.
The Tactical Directive reinforces the concept of “disciplined use of force”
in our partnership with Afghan Security Forces to defeat the insurgency
in Afghanistan.
The updated directive is classified; unclassified portions of the document
are included below.
“This directive applies to all ISAF and US ForcesAfghanistan (USFOR-A) forces operating under
operational
or
tactical
control . . . . Subordinate
commanders are not authorized to further restrict this
guidance without my approval.
Our counterinsurgency strategy is achieving progress in
the face of tough enemies and a number of other
challenges. Concentrating our efforts on protecting the
population is having a significant effect. We have
increased security in some key areas, and we have
reduced the number of civilian casualties caused by
coalition forces.
The Afghan population is, in a number of areas,
increasingly supportive of the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and of coalition forces.
We have also seen support for the insurgency decrease in
various areas as the number of insurgent-caused civilian
casualties has risen dramatically. We must build on
this momentum.
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This effort is a contest of wills. Our enemies will do all
that they can to shake our confidence and the confidence
of the Afghan people. In turn, we must continue to
demonstrate our resolve to the enemy. We will do so
through our relentless pursuit of the Taliban and others
who mean Afghanistan harm, through our compassion
for the Afghan people, and through the example we
provide to our Afghan partners.
We must continue—indeed, redouble—our efforts to
reduce the loss of innocent civilian life to an absolute
minimum. Every Afghan civilian death diminishes our
cause. If we use excessive force or operate contrary to
our counterinsurgency principles, tactical victories may
prove to be strategic setbacks.
We must never forget that the center of gravity in this
struggle is the Afghan people; it is they who will
ultimately determine the future of Afghanistan . . . .
Prior to the use of fires, the commander approving the
strike must determine that no civilians are present. If
unable to assess the risk of civilian presence, fires are
prohibited, except under of the following two conditions
(specific conditions deleted due to operational security;
however, they have to do with the risk to ISAF and
Afghan forces).
(NOTE) This directive, as with the previous version,
does not prevent commanders from protecting the
lives of their men and women as a matter of selfdefense where it is determined no other options are
available to effectively counter the threat.
. . . Protecting the Afghan people does require killing,
capturing, or turning the insurgents. Indeed, as I noted
earlier, we must pursue the Taliban tenaciously. But we
must fight with great discipline and tactical patience.
We must balance our pursuit of the enemy with our
efforts to minimize loss of innocent civilian life, and
with our obligation to protect our troops. Our forces
have been striving to do that, and we will continue to
do so.
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In so doing, however, we must remember that it is a
moral imperative both to protect Afghan civilians and
to bring all assets to bear to protect our men and women
in uniform and the Afghan security forces with whom
we are fighting shoulder-to-shoulder when they are in a
tough spot.
We must be consistent throughout the force in our
application of this directive and our rules of
engagement. All commanders must reinforce the right
and obligation of self-defense of coalition forces, of our
Afghan partners, and of others as authorized by the
rules of engagement.
We must train our forces to know and understand the
rules of engagement and the intent of the tactical
directive. We must give our troopers the confidence to
take all necessary actions when it matters most, while
understanding the strategic consequences of civilian
casualties. Indeed, I expect our troopers to exert their
best judgment according to the situation on the ground.
Beyond that, every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine
has my full support as we take the fight to the enemy.
. . . Partnering is how we operate. Some civilian
casualties result from a misunderstanding or ignorance
of local customs and behaviors. No individuals are
more attuned to the Afghan culture than our Afghan
partners. Accordingly, it is essential that all operations
be partnered with an ANSF unit and that our Afghan
partners be part of the planning and execution phases.
Their presence will ensure greater situational
awareness. It will also serve to alleviate anxiety on the
part of the local population and build confidence in
Afghan security forces.
I expect every operation and patrol to be partnered. If
there are operational reasons why partnership is not
possible for a particular operation, the CONOP
approval authority must be informed . . . .
Partnership is an essential aspect of our
counterinsurgency strategy. It is also an indispensible
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element of the transition of security responsibility to
ANSF.
Again, we need to build on the momentum we are
achieving. I expect every trooper and commander to use
force judiciously, especially in situations where
civilians may be present. At the same time, we must
employ all assets to ensure our troopers’ safety, keeping
in mind the importance of protecting the Afghan people
as we do.
This is a critical challenge at a critical time; but we
must and will succeed. I expect that everyone under my
command, operational and tactical, will not only
adhere to the letter of this directive, but—more
importantly—to its intent.
Strategic and operational commanders cannot
anticipate every engagement. We have no desire to
undermine the judgment of tactical commanders.
However, that judgment should always be guided by my
intent. Take the fight to the enemy. And protect the
Afghan people and help our Afghan partners defeat the
insurgency.”
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